余果:错误的战争,还是错误的引用?

  时至今日,我们已经不难了解到,美国的布莱德利将军在朝鲜战争期间说的“如果改变目前的战略——即把战争规模限制在朝鲜半岛——而把战火扩大至中国领土,那么我们将会‘在错误的地点、错误的时间和错误的敌人打错误的战争’”这句话当年传到了中国以后,被缩减成了“美国将军说:”我们在错误的地点、错误的时间和错误的敌人打错误的战争‘“,似乎美军败的狼狈,美国将军垂头丧气得非同一般。这是一个断章取义、扭曲真相的典型。中国军队在朝鲜半岛以其意志与勇气取得了非凡的成就,但有的人却自以为是地要用欺骗行为让这个事业蒙受污点,实在令人费解。当然,到了50年后的信息时代,真相早已能够被揭开。鉴于此错误的引用仍然在中国网络及传媒间广泛流传并造成误会,我觉得有必要把当年对此事件的第一手记录和报道作较全面的翻译和公开,以澄清事实。

  布莱德利说这句话的历史背景,是麦克阿瑟和杜鲁门所代表的两派在朝鲜战争期间的争论。这是对战争的看法、策略和前景的争论,实际上也是民主、共和两党之间的对立与分歧。当麦克阿瑟过于激进的反共产中国的言论变得越发极端和具有煽动性的时候,感到不安的杜鲁门于1951年4月11日撤掉了这个在政治上与他对立、在言谈举止上令他反感的将军。但麦克阿瑟回国后于4月19日在国会发表的告别演说当中,仍不忘大肆鼓吹他的政治观点,并提出了四个具体的反华策略:

  1、加强对中国的经济封锁;

  2、对中国海岸实施封锁;

  3、取消对海空军攻击中国东北的限制;

  4、取消禁止蒋介石军队加入战争的命令。

  这就是著名的“老兵不死”演说。麦克阿瑟富于激情的言辞和极其出色的演讲技巧不仅在共和党人中引发强烈共鸣,也在一时间征服了美国的大多数媒体和民众。这令杜鲁门政府感到前所未有的压力,并觉得如果麦克阿瑟的建议被采纳,战火很可能真的要扩大至中国大陆,而这是精明谨慎的政治家和有责任心的军队高层都一直极力避免的。于是,时任参谋长联席会议主席的布莱德利必须站出来对国会和美国国民澄清政府的立场,并以具有说服力的言辞回击麦克阿瑟的主张。从5月15日开始,他在参议院军事外交关系委员会出席作证,声明:参谋长联席会议和总统都担忧麦克阿瑟的主张一旦被采纳很有可能让美国“在错误的地点、错误的时间和错误的敌人打错误的战争”。第二天,纽约时报对事件进行了详尽的报道,wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy一说也就由此传遍世界。我有幸在纽约时报的网上购得了这一历史资料的扫描记录,并在此作翻译和公开。

  文章标题:Top Military Leader Takes Stand: Sees Great Peril. Implies we must stand ready against Soviet, not Red China.

  全文较长,在这里只作部分摘录并翻译其大意:

  WASHINGTON, May 15- The highest military officer of the United States declared today that the rejected Korean war Strategy of General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur would have been dangerous and wrong fourfold.

  美国军队最高指挥官今天声明议被否决的麦克阿瑟的关于朝鲜战争的战略是危险和错误的。

  General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserted that General Macarthur‘s plans would have involved the United States with Communist China “in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy”. It was not Read China but Soviet Russia, he said by implication, against which this country must stand ready.

  参谋长联席会议主席,五星上将奥马尔-N-布莱德利断言麦克阿瑟将军的计划将使美国在错误的地点,错误的时间和错误的敌人——中国——卷入错误的战争。他暗示,美国真正应该防范的敌人是苏联,而不是红色中国。

  Testifying before Senate Committees investigating President Truman‘s recall of General Macarthur form the Far East Command, General Bradley, for himself and for all the three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported the President’s action without qualification.

  在就杜鲁门总统撤销麦克阿瑟将军远东总司令之职一事面对参议院委员会作的证明上,布莱德利代表他本人及参谋长联席会议全部三个成员,表示无条件支持总统的行动。

  ……

  General Bradley, who will return tomorrow for his second day of testimony, stated at the outset that he would not “say anything to discredit the long and illustrious career of General Douglas Macarthur.”

  布莱德利将军明天将继续出席作证,他在开始时表示他将不会“说任何诋毁麦克阿瑟将军长期而杰出的军事生涯”。

  He went on then, however, to hit very hard at all the major Macarthur proposals for broader military action against the Chinese Communists in Korea.

  但是他接着非常严厉地批评了麦克阿瑟关于在朝鲜扩大对华军事行动的主张。

  He made these assertions, among many others:

  他做了不少判断,包括:

  1. That General Macarthur‘s policy—for bombing in communist China, for putting on a naval blockade, for using the Chinese Nationalist troops of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa—would have “increased the risk of global war, ”and unnecessarily so.

  麦克阿瑟关于轰炸中国、海禁中国、以及动用蒋介石军队的主张将增加导致一场不必要的全球战争的风险。

  2. That the present policy of limited commitments in Korea was the best and safest method by which to conduct the campaign.

  目前的在朝鲜进行有限军事行动的政策对于进行战役是最好以及最安全的。

  3. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimously with the President in insisting on this policy and that they were in better position, viewing the whole world scene, than General Macarthur to assess the world risks.

  参谋长联席会议一致地支持总统坚持这项政策的决定。他们比麦克阿瑟在衡量全球风险上站在更有力的位置观察全球情况。

  4. That Korea, “in spite of the importance of the engagement,” must be seen as “just one phase of this battle we are having with the other power centre in the world [the Soviet Union.]”

  “尽管战斗是重要的”,但是朝鲜(战争)必须被视为“于世界另外一个核心——苏联——的斗争的其中一个阶段而已”。

  5. That there was no claim that the present strategy of “means short of total war” would necessarily prevent that war, but that if it came the United Sates could not be held responsible before the world.

  目前的“局限战争”的战略并不保证能避免这个战争,但一旦它爆发,美国并不需要对其承担责任。

  6. That “enlargement” of the war in Korea, as General Macarthur had recommended, “would probably delight the Kremlin more than anything else we could do. ”

  麦克阿瑟所建议的“扩大”朝鲜战争的建议“很可能除了会让克里姆林宫感到高兴以外没有任何其他建设性。”

  7. That statements suggesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been overruled by Secretary Marshall or President Truman were “just not so.” It was the Joint Chiefs, General Bradley said, who recommended the present strategy in Korea.

  关于参谋长联席会议受制于国务卿马歇尔和总统杜鲁门的说法是不正确的。布莱德利说,提出目前的朝鲜战略的正是参谋长联席会议。

  8. That this country was not in position to engage in a two-front-war—and not, indeed, “in the best military position” as yet to seek any sort of “showdown.”

  美国并处在一个要陷入双线作战的局面,也并非可以“站在一个最有利的军事局面”去寻求任何“决战。”

  9. That the course of action so far followed by the administration had avoided world war while this country‘s strength was steadily rising—a war that would destroy “millions of Americans,” in the United States as well as on the battlefield.

  目前的策略已经避免了一场会在美国国内外导致大量伤亡的世界大战的发生,而与此同时国家的力量正在稳步提升。

  10. That “taking on ” communist China would not guarantee a victory even in Korea, and would be jumping “from a smaller conflict to a larger deadlock at greater expense.”

  进攻共产中国甚至不能保证在朝鲜半岛取得胜利,却会使美国从一个较小的冲突转而陷入一个要付出巨大代价的更大的僵局。

  11. That some were calling “appeasement” any policy that did not risk world conflict and the loss of this country‘s European allies, who remained very much opposed to larger commitments in Korea.

  有些人希望采取“绥靖主意”政策,以避免世界冲突以及丢失欧洲盟国——它们一直反对在朝鲜进行大规模投入。

  ……

  As to bombing Red China, this, quite apart from the danger of involving this country in a mainland war, could not in any case reach the industrial vitals of the enemy, which, he implied, actually lay in the Soviet Union itself.

  至于轰炸红色中国,除了会有使美国陷入大陆战争的危险以外,不会危及敌方的重要工业,因为他们实际上位于苏联内部。

  As to a naval blockade, General Bradley continued, this would simply be an act of war and would not in any case be very effective if supported only by the United States and not by the rest of the United Nations.

  至于海上封锁,布莱德利接着指出,这除了是宣战的举动以外不会真正产生效果,如果这无法得到美国以外的其他联合国军的支持。

  As to the Macarthur recommendations for using the Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa, the witness asserted that those forces, apart from the fact that the rest of the United Nations did not want them, were not likely to be effective.

  至于麦克阿瑟建议使用的台湾军队,除了其他联合国军不希望他们加入以外,观察家也声言,他们不见得会有什么用处。

  ……[ii]

  通过以上的报道,我们可以较清晰地看明当时的实际情况了。当然,这只是其中一条资料,一条最早期的资料。一些年后,会议现场的官方纪录也被公开,。我们可以在维基百科上搜到这条记录,内容与上面那篇报道是一致的,只不过更概括(可惜我就无法接触这份原件了):

  I am under no illusion that our present strategy of using means short of total war to achieve our ends and oppose communism is a guarantee that a world war will not be thrust upon us. But a policy of patience and determination without provoking a world war, while we improve our military power, is one which we believe we must continue to follow…. Under present circumstances, we have recommended against enlarging the war from Korea to also include Red China. The course of action often described as a limited war with Red China would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize. Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.[iii]

  以上两段资料,不仅揭示了这句“名言”的真义,也能让我们对当时美国政府的态度有所了解。

  有趣的是,对布莱德利的话作这种断章取义的并不仅仅是中国人。由于党派斗争,美国人同样做了同样的事情。1955年2月7日的《时代》的一篇文章里面有这样一段:

  General Omar Bradley called Korea “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” But this was not the opinion of the commanders who knew most about that war.[iv]

  显然,这是一篇从共和党的立场出发抨击民主党执政时的战争策略的文章,它在努力地把布莱德利描写成一个垂头丧气失败者。而文章随后引用的几位将军的话,无疑都是和当年麦克阿瑟的主张一致的。在文中出现的人物无不抱怨当时的政府的策略。且看:

  Korea, said General James Van Fleet, “was the right war, at the right place, and the right time, against the right enemy and with the right allies.” The Communists had a long, vulnerable supply line, he said, but the U.S. “had command of the water and the air……"

  …

  But the U.S., failing to press home its advantages, made error upon critical error, according to the witnesses…As chief of the U.N. truce-talk delegation, Turner Joy had been most bitter about Washington’s order to accept a November 1951 Communist proposal to fix the battle line at that time as an armistice line. This, he said, “would constitute an immediate cease-fire on the basis of agreement on one item only of the agenda. Thus, the Communists would be insured against effects of future military operations while other agenda items were being discussed.

  ……

  General Ridgeway strongly requested reconsideration of Washington’s instructions.”… Instead of victory, what did the truce yield? “We left an enemy on the 38th parallel, right where he started.” lamented Clark. “True, we had stopped his immediate aggression to take over South Korea, but we left him there better trained……We left him there arrogant. He had made the people behind the Iron Curtain think that he had won a victory, and we left him ready and poised to strike again, as he did in Indo-China.”

  While Korea trained the Chinese Communist army, it did nothing for the Nationalist Chinese army, which was not allowed to send units to Korea—”a terrible mistake,” said Van Fleet. Using Chiang Kai-shek’s divisions, said Infantryman Van Fleet, would have told “which of his generals are good in combat and what the Nationalist troops can really do. Even today we do not know that answer.”[v]

  在此,我真不知是应该感慨全人类共同出色的创造力,还是叹息天下乌鸦一般黑——而且黑得五彩斑斓。

  许多年以后,这句话又在越南战争、伊拉克战争当中被引用,于是就越发著名了。当然,这是后来的事情。

  注释:

   Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary: first the intensification of our economic blockade against China; two the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; three removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China’s coastal areas and of Manchuria; four removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the common enemy.

  Macarthur, Douglas. (Delivered 19 April 1951). General Douglas Macarthur Farewell Address to Congress. 18/09/2007, from: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurfarewelladdress.htm

  [ii] Hocrtel, Bruce.  1951, May 16.  Top Military Leader Takes Stand, Sees Great Peril. New York Times. P A.26.

  [iii] From testimony before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, May 15, 1951.—Military Situation in the Far East, hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2, p. 732 (1951).

  Wiki Pedia: The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy [online]. Available: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_wrong_war,_at_the_wrong_place,_at_the_wrong_time,_and_with_the_wrong_enemy [19/09/2007]

  [iv] 1955, Feb 7. Time: Remember Korea [online]. Available:  http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,823712-1,00.html [19/09/2007]

  [v] 1955, Feb 7. Time: Remember Korea [online]. Available:  http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,823712-1,00.html [19/09/2007]

  私人博客:http://hugo68214227.spaces.live.com/

  学习博客:http://hi.baidu.com/yuhugo/

  作者:余果

当前位置:中国报道周刊 » 历史长河 » 错误的战争,还是错误的引用? 浏览数

5 条评论 »

  1. 红色中国 说:,

    2008年02月15日 星期五 @ 05:48:52

    1

    As to bombing Red China, this, quite apart from the danger of involving this country in a mainland war, could not in any case reach the industrial vitals of the enemy, which, he implied, actually lay in the Soviet Union itself.

      至于轰炸红色中国,除了会有使美国陷入大陆战争的危险以外,不会危及敌方的重要工业,因为他们实际上位于苏联内部。

    这句的翻译,请作者再斟酌。he implies, 和 itself, 似乎并非可有可无的修饰语。

    回复

  2. sfacp 说:,

    2008年02月15日 星期五 @ 21:46:19

    2

    非常感谢作者的贡献,令许多中国人看到历史真相,包括我自己。但作者同样犯有“错误的引用”,”实在令人费解”:

    1。 对布莱德利将军那句名言的“错误的引用”,绝非一两个人“自以为是”的行为,应是几十年来中宣部的官方观点。

    2。 作者把麦克阿瑟的反中共言论说成是反华言论,这是原则错误,这等于鼓吹台獨!因为麦克阿瑟在帮助台湾反攻大陆,如果说反中共等于反华,这等于说台湾不属于中国!其实这也是几十年来中宣部的官方观点: 反中共就等于反华。只是到了今天的“信息时代”,许多中国人还没看到这个观点的原则错误,”实在令人费解”

    许多历史事实,加上作者这里所翻译的纽约时报对事件的报道,都证明美国政府当年无意进攻中国。连林彪当年也说,美国要想打我们,3年前就打了,不需等到现在。所以志愿军去朝鲜是为了保家卫国的理由根本无法成立。但作者还是说“中国军队在朝鲜半岛以其意志与勇气取得了非凡的成就”,到底这成就有什么意义?”实在令人费解”

    回复

  3. 不是主人翁 说:,

    2008年02月18日 星期一 @ 03:06:55

    3

    少见多怪,如果没有断章取义就没有政治家了!!!古今中外无不如此,现代中国的更多一些而已.

    回复

  4. 东流 说:,

    2008年02月25日 星期一 @ 06:32:03

    4

    不愿被蒙蔽的中国人到了今天,终于看到了到底是谁在错误的时间、错误的地点和错误的敌人打了一场错误的战争!作为觉醒了的中国人,我们感谢以美国为首的联合国军,当年坚决地击退了妄图在整个朝鲜半岛建立金家王朝的金日成军队的战争挑衅,保卫了半岛南半段的民主政体,要不然,还不知道金日成(fucking) 父子要把朝鲜半岛变成怎样的人间地狱,以及饿死何止400万人。

    回复

  5. 张旭超 说:,

    2008年09月03日 星期三 @ 10:45:43

    5

    仲共尽骗老百姓

    回复

发表您的评论